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Abstract
The term hybrid warfare fails to properly describe Russian operations in
Ukraine and elsewhere. Russia has undertaken unconventional
techniques to build its influence and test the boundaries of a shaken
international system. Notably, Russia’s actions in Ukraine display an
evolved style of warfare that goes beyond its initial label of hybrid
warfare. The term non-linear war (NLW) will be defined in this article to
encompass Russia’s actions and allow policymakers the correct
framework to discuss and respond to Russia. NLW plays to the advantage
of countries like Russia and constitute the future of warfare.
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Introduction 
Pure conventional wars have lost value as a measure to complete political 
goals.  This has created a discourse around warfare introducing a litany of 
terms.  These terms include Fourth Generation Warfare, Full Spectrum 
Warfare, and Hybrid Warfare.  Most of these terms lack a generally accepted 
definition.  Thus, without universally accepted definitions, media and 
academic sources used these terms to describe how Russian military forces 
conducted operations in Ukraine in 2014 and Syria a year later.  Terms like 
Hybrid Warfare have been used to describe conventional and non-
conventional conflicts.  Though conceptualized to explain how conventional 
forces fight an insurgency engaged in a combination of conventional and 
unconventional tactics, hybrid warfare quickly came into use for Russia’s 
actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  This adaptation of the term fails to 
account for the drastic differences in methods and capabilities of non-state 
compared to state actors.  Though recent definitions of hybrid warfare have 
incorporated the actions of both state and non-state actors, this extends the 
term past the type of conflicts it originally defined and explained.  The 
principles of state-on-state conflict have advanced and evolved by technology 
and the current geopolitical situation.  A need remains to operationalize a 
term to provide the foundation for the rising strategies and tactics of state 
actors on the world stage.  This article will discuss how the current Western 
understanding of hybrid warfare does not encompass Russia’s actions.  Then 
the paper will define the term non-linear warfare to fill the academic and 
military void that hybrid warfare fails to cover.  Next, a review Russia’s 
development of non-linear tactics and its application of them in relation to 
Ukraine and the broader conflict with the West will contract non-linear 
operations to those of hybrid.    
 
Russia’s incursion into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 
challenged the concept of hybrid warfare.  Media and government sources 
labeled Russia’s actions as hybrid warfare, yet failed to define or explain what 
the term meant.1  This was likely due, in part, to the absence of a precise and 
widely accepted definition for hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, hybrid adversary, 
etc.  The term carries scholarly baggage that makes it a poor fit for Russia’s 
                                                          
1 “Ukrainian NSDC Secretary: Russia Waging Hybrid Warfare on EU,” The Baltic Times, 
February 2, 2016, available at: 
http://www.baltictimes.com/ukrainian_nsdc_secretary__russia_waging_hybrid_on
_eu. 
Schnaufer: Redefining Hybrid Warfare
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
 
 
18 
 
actions in Ukraine.2  Initially, deliberation around the term hybrid warfare 
heightened following the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon 
against Hezbollah.  This marked a dramatic increase of conventional, modern 
armies combating insurgents capable of certain conventional tactics and 
supported in many cases by state actors.  Additionally, these insurgents 
employed further measures playing to their strengths including criminal 
activities.  Soldiers and the media noted the different fighting techniques used 
against the Israeli Army during the conflict with Hezbollah.  Hezbollah fielded 
well-trained soldiers with modern equipment, but still did not have the full 
strength of a conventional force.3  The United States Military Forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan faced similar threats and methods of warfighting.  
Insurgents in all of these conflicts typically fought in an unconventional or 
irregular manner while employing some conventional and criminal tactics 
that played to their strengths all while dodging any pitched battles with 
modern armies.4  
 
The American Armed Forces came up with a number of definitions for hybrid 
warfare.  In a 2008 article, the Army Chief of Staff General Casey 
characterized a hybrid threat as an adversary that incorporates “Diverse and 
dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal 
capabilities.”5  Generally, hybrid warfare encompasses the application of 
criminal, conventional, irregular, and terrorist measures to attain the 
advantage in a war zone against a conventional foe.6  To further, support this 
point, the U.S. Army codified the term in its 2011 operations doctrine as, “The 
diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal 
elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve 
                                                          
2 David L.  Raugh, “Is the Hybrid Threat a True Threat,” Journal of Strategic Security 9:2 
(Summer 2016), available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/2/. 
3 Steven Erlanger, and Richard A. Oppel Jr, “A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel 
with Its Training, Tactics and Weapons,” The New York Times, August 07, 2006, 
available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07hezbollah.html. 
4 Frank G.  Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007, available at: 
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_
0108.pdf. 
5 George C.  Casey, “America's Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” Army Magazine 
(October 2008): 28, available at: 
https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/Casey_1008.pdf 
6 Craisor-Constantin Ionita, “Is Hybrid Warfare Something New?” Strategic Impact 
(2014): 61-71, available at: 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=url,cookie,ip&db=tsh&
AN=108750555&site=ehost-live&scope=sit. 
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mutually benefitting effects.”7  This amalgamation of four key modes of 
operations came to set the closest thing to a generally accepted definition of 
hybrid warfare for the United States Military up until Russia’s actions in 
2014. 
 
The term hybrid warfare started primarily with non-state actors fighting 
states and their methods, this precludes Russia’s recent tactics from falling 
under the terminology of hybrid war.  Russia’s status as a state means that it 
holds international recognition, has signed on to international law, has a large 
trade network, a ready supply of natural resources, a legitimate government, 
and functions in a capacity to have diplomatic ties to a level incomparable to 
non-state actors.  Russia also carries the ability for larger expeditionary 
capabilities and possesses soft power.  In addition, most definitions of hybrid 
warfare do not include the information, economic, social, and political aspects 
of warfare that states can apply on a much larger scale compared to non-state 
actors and for a much different intent.  Though Russia has used what would 
typically be referred to as hybrid warfare techniques, they have superseded 
those methods through the broader geopolitical objectives of their 
implementation.  Nothing in any of the explanations of hybrid warfare 
accounts for a broader geopolitical strategy.  Truly, to have the term hybrid 
warfare encompass this broader geopolitical strategy would change its 
previous meaning and the concept it originally sought to examine.  Thus, the 
actions of Russia leaves the term Hybrid Warfare wanting.    
 
Thus, there is a need to operationalize a new term to incorporate portions of 
hybrid warfare and other methods that fall into a grand scheme of operations 
perpetrated by states.  Russia has surpassed the four means of hybrid warfare 
highlighted above—conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal—and has 
added information, cyber, and economic, diplomatic, political, and social 
means to their strategy.  For this reason, some scholars, including Mark 
Galeotti, Michael Kofman, and Matt Rojansky, have stated that Russia’s 
methods have entered a realm not yet defined by scholars or defense 
officials.8  The following section will argue that this next realm of warfare 
should be termed non-linear warfare.    
                                                          
7 U.S.  Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations C-1 (GPO, Washington, DC: February 2011): 1-
5. 
8 Michael Kofman, and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia's ‘Hybrid War,’” 
Kennan Institute, April 2015, available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=190090; Mark Galeotti, “Hybrid War as a War on 
Governance,” Interview by Octavian Manea, Small Wars Journal, August 19, 2015, 
available at: 
Schnaufer: Redefining Hybrid Warfare
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Defining Non-linear Warfare: Term and Concept 
The term non-linear warfare (NLW) appeared at least as far back as the mid 
1990’s without any clear definition or distinction.  The major injection for its 
use today comes from Russian General Gerasimov’s February 27, 2013 article 
in the Military-Industrial Kurier.9  That article describes the foundation of 
nonlinear warfare, “As a means to reach desired strategic orientation and 
geopolitical outcomes primarily using non-military approaches.”10  Though no 
accepted definition of non-linear warfare exists, this paper hopes to introduce 
based on how the West has reacted to Russian actions.  Little novelty exists in 
Russia’s actions; rather the novelty rests in the manner in which they carried 
out these actions.  Advances in technology and the global political climate 
have set the stage for non-linear warfare to be very advantageous to states in a 
situation like Russia.     
 
General Gerasimov’s article lays the groundwork for principles behind NLW 
as mentioned.  He concludes,  
 
“In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines 
between the states of war and peace.  Wars are no longer declared and, 
having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.”11   
 
Russia has carried out this unfamiliar template in Ukraine, Syria, across 
Europe, and elsewhere.  Russia has conducted multiple non-linear actions to 
observe the response of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  General Gerasimov further declared, “The very ‘rules 
of war’ have changed.  The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political 
and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the 
                                                          
http://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=A0LEVrfwDnRX6OkACwAnnIlQ;_ylu=X3oDMTEyM
2dldTh0BGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDQjIxNzJfMQRzZWMDc3I-. 
9 Robert Coalson, “Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin’s Plan for Ukraine,” The 
Huffington Post, September 2, 2o14, available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-coalson/valery-gerasimov-putin-
ukraine_b_5748480.html. 
10 Victor Morris, “Grading Gerasimov: Evaluating Russian Nonlinear War through 
Modern Chinese Doctrine,” Small Wars Journal, September 17, 2015, available at: 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUK
EwiiqfWg7ILMAhXH2yYKHV9JBvAQFggdMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsmallwarsjourn
al.com%2Fprintpdf%2F30157&usg=AFQjCNFMiRaC3KT_zsBPZ_3VwMVI9CdR9w&sig
2=-gYQhmw546IOrXDNRkkBuQ. 
11 Coalson, Top Russian General.” 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss1/3
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1538
 
 
21 
 
power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”12  Any military planner looks 
to play to their own strengths and Russia has done just that.  Unable to 
compete with the conventional strength of the NATO Alliance, Russia has 
invested its efforts on divisions within the alliance, gray areas within the 
international arena and law, and blurring the line between peace and war. 
 
The concept of “non-linear” describes that the conflict does not have clear 
front lines or district friendly/enemy areas.  Non-linear warfare relies on the 
subversion and division of the enemy’s social and political structure allowing 
the aggressor to do their will by any means, not just brute force.  The idea of 
NLW comes from the approach that it has no bounds and sometimes 
functions with limited planning, thus allowing a state to exploit an 
opportunity.  Non-linear warfare employs many measures that would not 
seem like warfare although the goal, as in all war, is to force the enemy to do 
your will.  In NLW, instead of tanks doing all the work, propaganda, political 
and social agitators, and cyberattacks do most of the forcing.  This does not 
mean kinetic action or hard tactics remain unutilized.  Russia’s “little green 
men” in Crimea or Russian military support for the pro-Russian combatants 
in Eastern Ukraine provide prime example of these hard tactics.  The key in 
using these approaches in NLW revolves around making it unclear what is 
going on.  Again, when the “little green men” first appeared, no one could 
confirm what they were there to do or who sent them.     
 
Non-linear warfare also applies pressures on an enemy to weaken their 
resolve against any forceful contestation and to make any decision to act 
impossible because of the heightened state of unknowns.  Non-linear 
operations vary in scale and time.  Generally, the pressures focus on the core 
vital functions of a society and look to undermine them.  This includes all 
measures taken to undermine a nation’s government to cause it to lose the 
general support of the people.  Non-linear warfare by principle means that 
international law and diplomatic integrity have lost all value because neither 
supports the aggressor’s position.  Additionally, opportunities provide a 
critical factor in the use of non-linear operations.  These operations tend not 
to have an established plan of attacks; rather, they compose a form of warfare 
where offensives only take place if a chance of success exists.  In NLW, one 
side tends to be constantly reacting (as seen with the West in relation to 
Russia’s actions).  It is near impossible to plan for every type of non-linear 
operation and thus a state must stand ever watchful and ready to react quickly 
                                                          
12 Ibid.   
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not only to military threats, but also in other arenas such as cyber, economic, 
information, social, etc.    
 
Non-linear warfare differs from hybrid warfare in its methods, but also 
because it utilizes a grand strategy approach to warfare, where force on force 
conflict plays only a part of a larger subversive and indirect weakening of the 
enemy.  The grand strategy approach constitutes, “the collection of plans and 
policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, 
military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s 
national interest.  Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends and means.”13  
This grand strategy has no mention or comparison in hybrid warfare.    
 
While undertaking this non-linear grand strategy, the lines between war and 
peace are blurred.  It causes states to act without a clear declaration of war.  It 
brings Clausewitz’s concept of the “Fog of War” on the battlefield to a larger 
scale.  Russia’s targets or enemies in this non-linear strategy are not 
Ukrainian nationalist or Syrian rebels alone, but the West as a whole.  If 
Russia wanted to take Ukraine by force, it could, but if the West became 
involved, Russia would likely lose a conventional war.  For Russia to enact its 
will, it must counter Western conventional strength with non-linear 
operations set on a grand strategy basis.  Actors must consider the big picture 
in non-linear warfare.     
 
Over time, non-linear methods try to put the aggressor in a position of 
strength, not necessarily with military buildup, but rather by a campaign that 
undermines the other state’s legitimacy to its population and decreases the 
morale of its armed forces.  In time, this may internally fracture the state 
facing the non-linear campaign without the need for large-scale military 
operations by the aggressor.  It also aims at the decision making process of a 
country’s government and looks to delay it or incapacitate it.  Non-linear 
warfare methods try to delay any smoking gun, until a proper reaction to the 
events seems too late.  Take Russia’s “little green men” in Crimea.  Once it 
became clear what had taken place no clear reaction remained.  Measures like 
these elicit no clear response and leave the other side full of questions and 
uncertainties.     
 
Furthermore, non-linear warfare tends to lead to the poisoning of the political 
environment.  When trust on the international system comes into question, it 
                                                          
13 Peter Feaver, “What is Grand Strategy and Why Do We Need It,” Foreign Policy, April 
8, 2009, available at:  http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/08/what-is-grand-strategy-
and-why-do-we-need-it/. 
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opens the door for possible non-linear operations.  Hence, states using non-
linear techniques tend not to have the capabilities to forcefully win, but 
instead must wait for an occasion of weakness or an overlooked security gap 
to exploit.  Again, the chaos surrounding the Euromaidan protests opened a 
door for Russia to take aggressive non-linear action in Ukraine.  If 
opportunities like the Euromaidan do not materialize on their own to provide 
the setting for non-linear operations, then aggressors may apply other NLW 
measures over time to create the setting for more forceful tactics. 
 
The overall objective of a state engaging in NLW is the wearing down of the 
enemy socially, politically, and militarily.  A successful non-linear campaign 
will leave the defending state in one of the following conditions.  First, they   
will not have the political will to fight and thus leave the aggressor to do their 
will.  Second, the conventional forces have been diminished and alliances 
divided to a point where the defensive state could be defeated on the 
battlefield.  Third, the defensive state simply acquiesced to just the threat of 
force.  Finally, the defensive state becomes indifferent to the aggressor’s 
operations and allows them to act at their will without interference.  That is 
the end game in NLW - conducting operations to allow you to have the 
freedom of maneuver to undertake your plan.  For example, Russia would like 
to have a free hand in it is near abroad without Western interference.  So far, 
NLW has advanced Russia’s ability to do so noting that the only major 
ramifications have been sanctions and loss of some soft power abroad.     
 
Moreover, the geopolitical situation and the lack of global stability have 
allowed non-linear warfare to thrive.  Globalization and the interconnected 
nature of markets have also played a critical role.  Much like the method itself, 
the advent of non-linear operations came from opportunity and the lack of an 
effective deterrent and social will.  When an opportunity for NLW appears 
and a state engages in such actions, the defending state must enact an 
immediate and strong response.  Considering that attribution for a non-linear 
act typically is not clear, a strong response maybe hard to direct.    
 
The terminology within NLW strays away from the standard terms to describe 
missions and operations.  When armies discuss operations, their missions 
include words such as assault, breach, clear, control, secure, seize, etc.  In 
NLW, these terms have a place, but not a primary role as in conventional or 
even irregular warfare.14  Additionally, the term is applied to missions include 
persuade, deny, confuse, disenfranchise, lie, conceal, misrepresent, fund, 
                                                          
14 United States Army, “Ranger Handbook,” February, 2011.    
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destabilize, erode, etc.  This terminology shows the drastically different 
methods employed to obtain an objective.   
 
Based on the above discussion of the concept of NLW, the definition would 
read as follows; non-linear warfare is the application of collective subversive 
measures on a state(s) by another state actor, targeting its government, 
population, and vital social functions, in order to fulfill a grand strategy and 
to do the latter is will without a clear declaration of war.     
 
Russian Operations beyond the Hybrid Definition 
With Non-linear warfare defined, one must examine what action Russia has 
taken that differs from the hybrid warfare definition.  Non-linear warfare 
incorporates many different manners and methods of warfare along with 
some purely non-linear operations to achieve its objectives.  This article will 
focus on the primarily new methods of NLW such as the “little green men” 
and internet trolls that do not fall into the hybrid concept.  These are not the 
only possible non-linear operations, but also some of the ones used most 
common by Russia.  Non-linear warfare is still developing and new operations 
have evolved and will continue to evolve.    
 
Before reviewing the recent status of Russia’s non-linear war, one most note 
how Russia has developed its NLW methods.  Some scholars have noted that 
the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 signaled the beginning of 
Russia’s overt policy change.15  This assassination of a British citizen in 
London proved that Russia was willing to test the boundaries of the 
established order, even though Litvinenko, had defected to the British and 
was highly critical of Russian President Vladimir Putin.  It was not so much 
that the Russian government likely had him assassinated, but the method of 
the assassination.  Russian agents put rare radioactive material in his tea and 
he died a slow painful death garnering plenty of media coverage.  This public 
display of assassination fit into NLW techniques by testing the response of the 
West and showing that Russia will reach out and touch individuals regardless 
of citizenship or location.  This topic has resurfaced recently as new evidence 
shows that Putin likely ordered the assassination, as experts previously 
thought, and that Russian agents carried it out.16  The use of assassination 
and the desired political goal accomplished goes beyond the four key concepts 
                                                          
15 Brian Whitmore, “Podcast: A Toxic Trail,” The Power Vertical, January 22, 2016, 
available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/podcast-a-toxic-trail/27504206.html. 
16 Ibid. 
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of hybrid warfare.  It plays into the grand strategy of showing the strength of 
Russia.      
 
Another example of NLW materialized in 2007, when the Russian 
Government allegedly carried out a cyber-attack on Estonia in response to the 
Estonian Government’s discrimination against its Russian population and its 
order to remove a Soviet statue from Tallinn.17  Governments cannot trace the 
actors that commit cyber-attacks or confirm their intention, but a number of 
scholars pin the attack in Estonia on Russia.18  That is the beauty of non-
linear warfare: who did the action and why?  Cyber-attacks constitute a 
perfect non-linear method as a cyber-attack cannot be traced easily and even 
if the country of origin is known, the actor cannot be identified.  In addition, 
cyber-attacks create a sense of uncertainty that plays so well in NLW, adding 
to the “Fog of War.”  Can the government protect the banks and other 
institutions from cyberattacks?  These attacks have lost companies money and 
business bringing into question the ability of the government to protect 
them.19  One of these events blamed on Russia was the cyberattack on the 
Polish stock market.20  Even if a government sponsored such an attack, they 
have easy deniability.  Cyber-warfare sponsored by states allows them to be 
used within the NLW definition.  Cyber-terrorism for example would place 
cyber-attacks more with the hybrid warfare concept.  Cyber-attacks help to 
define the terms and the role that the geopolitical ramifications fit into the 
definitions.  In NLW, there is a larger geopolitical intent for an attack, while 
hybrid warfare constrains its definition to a more finite propose on a smaller 
scale.    
 
A year after the cyber-attack in Estonia, Russia was at war with the small 
country of Georgia.  The war in Georgia comprised of conventional fighting 
with the aftermath composed of non-linear factors including the 
establishment of a frozen conflict.  Some of Russia’s NLW methods before and 
during the war later would be reused and refined in Ukraine, notably the 
issuing of Russian passports to Georgian citizens in contested areas before the 
                                                          
17 “A Cyber-riot.” The Economist.  May 10, 2007, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/9163598. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “Cyber Attacks: Effects on UK Companies,” Oxford Economics, July 2014, available at: 
http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/my-oxford/projects/276032. 
20 Micheal Riley, and Jordan Robertson, “Cyberspace Becomes Second Front in Russia's 
Clash With NATO,” Bloomberg, October 14, 2015, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-14/cyberspace-becomes-second-
front-in-russia-s-clash-with-nato. 
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conflict.21  Russia found the issuing of passports to Ukrainian citizens in 
Crimea a useful tactic, especially in Sevastopol (home to Russia’s Black Sea 
Fleet).  President Putin used the passports as part of the justification for the 
invasion of Ukraine, similar to Georgia 6 years earlier.  Of course, these 
excuses used by Russia do little on the international stage to justify its 
invasion, but they do generate some confusion.  Nevertheless, these actions 
may play a bigger role at home in Russia having generated support for the 
war.  All of these examples play into the main goal of NLW—the uncertainty 
of the truth and the division of the enemy from within to the point where they 
are unable to act.    
 
On February 28, 2014, another operation enters the NLW playbook with the 
phenomena known as the “little green men” who appeared around Crimea.  
They were armed men wearing Russian style military uniforms without any 
markings, flags, or insignia.  They occupied key objectives around Crimea 
including the Simferopol Airport.22  With the confusion following the collapse 
of the government in Kiev, Russia easily denied that those armed men had 
any ties to Russia.  Russia had counted on the probability that the Ukrainian 
military stationed in Crimea would not resist.  News reports speculated who 
the “little green men” were and what their mission entailed.  Some rumors 
that they came to protect the Russian population as part of local militia 
groups.  When reporters questioned the uniformed men about their origin 
and mission, they just stated they were volunteers.  Before Kiev or the West 
could respond militarily, Crimea fell to Russian control.      
 
In addition to the more forceful act of the “little green men,” Russia 
historically has used propaganda as a tactic of non-linear war, but the 
evolution of misinformation as a weapon reveals the potential potency of non-
linear operations.  Russia has expanded its misinformation campaign by 
increasing the funding of some media outlets it owns, like RT (originally 
Russia Today), and expanding its coverage of countries in Western Europe 
and North America.  Russia forecasted large increases in the funding of RT in 
the last few years allowing fast and effective expansion, but that has slowed 
funding because of sanctions and low oil prices.23  RT’s mission is to generate 
                                                          
21 “Europe: The Blame Game; the Russia-Georgia War,” The Economist, October 3, 2009: 
65-6, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/14560958.   
22 Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (London: I. B.  Tauris, 
2015), 102-106. 
23 Josh Halliday, “BBC World Service Fears Losing Information War as Russia Today 
Ramps up Pressure,” The Guardian, December 21, 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/dec/21/bbc-world-service-information-
war-russia-today. 
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a sense of questioning in the audience making it seem as if there is 
tremendous speculation around an event.  Their propaganda varies by 
country and audience.  RT usually frames its stories in such a way as to 
generate the most support for their likely audience.  In Russia for example, 
the Russian media has supposedly pushed the idea that there is no truth, so 
you might as well believe the one of your homeland Russia.24  In Germany, 
the propaganda has a softer goal of just persuading the German population to 
support lifting sanctions on Russia.  The propaganda commonly makes up 
numbers to show the German people the economic benefits of lifting 
sanctions and the harmful strains that the sanctions continue to hold on the 
German economy.25  In addition, Russia has continued to try to divide the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), by 
showing that the economic crisis with Greece damages the hard work of the 
German people.26  In Czech Republic and Slovakia, pro-Russian militia 
groups have formed partly because of Russian propaganda in the region 
spinning events to show the need for the formation of such groups.  Though 
the groups are not outwardly pro-Russia, they have caused concern for the 
government and threatened to break laws.27  These subversion and 
propaganda tactics fall clearing into the definition of NLW, but have no place 
in hybrid warfare.    
 
Another more recent form of misinformation comes from Russian trolls on 
the Internet.  Trolls are individuals spread false information online to create 
doubt or fear.  They do this mainly through the comment section of websites.  
Russian trolls have been observed commenting on social media or media 
sites.28  This misinformation campaign has the same goal of non-linear 
warfare, to blur the truth to a point where it seems none exists.29  They also 
seek to spread chaos and fear.  In some cases, they report on events that never 
happened and hope other legitimate news agencies pick it up and print the 
story.  Thanks to the lack of fact checking in Western media, trolls have been 
able to push complete lies.  A story reporting on a chemical fire in LA and a 
story about an outbreak of Ebola in Atlanta both show how far these false 
                                                          
24 Tetyana Matychak, conversation with author in Kiev, Ukraine, July 2015. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ivana Smolenova, “Is Pro-Russian Propaganda  Fueling Czech and Slovak Paramilitary 
Groups?” StopFake.org, December 20, 2015, available at: 
http://www.stopfake.org/en/is-pro-russian-propaganda-fueling-czech-and-slovak-
paramilitary-groups/. 
28 Adrian Chen, “The Agency,” The New York Times, June 2, 2015, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0.   
29 Adrian Chen, interview by Audie Cornish.  NPR, June 04, 2015. 
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reports can reach the public.30  The trolls even create fake websites, images, 
and videos to add legitimacy to their falsified stories.31  This non-linear tactic 
has proven to be a great way to spread misinformation and to confuse enemy 
populations.  It has a low financial and political cost with easy deniability.  In 
NLW, internet troll help to break down the decision-making abilities of a 
government.  In addition, they hinder the government’s ability to build public 
support for issues.  They can also cause distrust in the host government.32  All 
allow the state employing NLW tactics to have more influence and freedom of 
movement in the area.     
 
Another non-liner method is to support groups in enemy countries that cause 
unrest or problems for the governments.  Russia has supported the right wing 
group, the National Front, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and similar 
groups in and throughout Europe, notably in Poland.33  The refugee crisis in 
Europe resulting from the civil war in Syria has provided these right wing 
parties more support over the last year.34  The refugee crisis offers another 
opportunity for Russia to spread emotionally charged misinformation on an 
issue that has and will continue to divide the West.  For example, the Russian 
media broadcasted a story from Germany about a Russian girl who was 
abducted and raped in Germany by refugees even though German officials 
stated that refugees neither raped, nor abducted her.  Either way, it plays to 
the Russian’s advantage to show no clear facts and continue to play into the 
growing disdain toward refugees.35  The anti-refugee movement in Germany 
has looked for any story like this to support their argument.  Even though it 
maybe made it, they can use it as speculation.   
 
Furthermore, Russia’s bombing in Syria may be creating more refugees and 
further heightening the problem for Europe.  Russia leveling cities in Syria to 
cause more refugees to flee to Europe, if true, would be a non-linear warfare 
technique though there has not been enough evidence to prove that is their 
primary intention.  The world is demanding answers and Russia can point a 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.    
32 Norman Hermant, “Russian Troll Factory Manipulates News for Kremlin Bosses,” ABC 
News, August 12, 2015, available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-12/inside-
russia's-troll-factory-internet-forums-social-media/6692318. 
33 Alina Polyakova, “Putinism and the European Far Right,” Institute of Modern Russia, 
January 9, 2016, available at: http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2500-putinism-
and-the-european-far-right. 
34 Gustav Gressel, “Russia's Hybrid Interference in Germany's Refugee Policy,” European 
Council on Foreign Relations, February 4, 2016, available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russias_hybrid_interference_in_germanys_
refugee_policy5084.    
35 Ibid.   
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finger at Europe and say how cruel they are for not taking more refugees, 
while at the same time funding political parties in Europe that call for their 
removal, thereby reducing Western soft power.    
 
Additionally, Russia has supported NGOs and think tanks in the West that 
cause unrest or opposition.  These groups have included environmental 
groups, extreme left and right wing parties, and organizations lead by ethnic 
Russian citizens.36  All of these methods support subversive measure and the 
grand strategy to divide the West and make Russia look strong.  The four key 
warfighting techniques in hybrid warfare fail to address the above operations, 
thus the need for the NLW definition.     
 
Moreover, in 2014, Russia tempted chance with the arrest of an Estonian 
agent on their respective border.  This caused great concern in NATO.  Would 
the arrest of the agent be enough for NATO to act in defense of one of its 
members?  That is again the beauty of non-linear conflict, out of principle 
there should never be a clear smoking gun until it is too late.  Russia and 
Estonia ended up conducting a spy swap and Russia came away without 
major penalty.37  Incidents like these allow Russia to see the limits of its NLW 
campaign.  Along the same lines, Russian military aircraft have conducted air 
missions close to and in NATO airspace eliciting a NATO response in the form 
of scrambled jets to meet the Russian aircraft.  In 2014 alone, NATO 
documented over 140 of such interceptions.38  To scramble two jets to 
intercept aircraft can cost over $175,000 each time.39  Clearly, this is costly for 
Russia as well, but it allows them to keep NATO in a reactionary mindset.  
The downing of a Russian fighter over Turkey in late 2015 finally showed 
Russia a clear boundary for its non-linear operations.    
 
                                                          
36 Sanita Jemberga, Mikk Salu, and Šarūnas Černiauskas, “Kremlin's Millions: How 
Russia Funds NGOs in Baltics,” The Lithuanian Tribune, September 4, 2015, available at: 
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baltics.d?id=68908408%5D. 
37 Mark Galeotti, “Estonian Kidnap Is Russia's Latest Provocation,” The Moscow Times, 
September 11, 2014, available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/estonian-kidnap-is-russia-s-latest-
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Allied Powers Europe, October 29, 2014, available at: http://www.aco.nato.int/nato-
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Finally, Russia also has used private security companies (PSC) to carry out 
some of its military operations.40  How does a state react to the actions of a 
PSC?  Does the defensive state consider PSCs the same as an opposing state’s 
military?  Even so, they offer the deniability that they never received orders 
from a government.  This will be an area of future struggle—how to deal with 
PSCs and their use by legitimate governments—and exemplifies non-linear 
tactics.  The United Nations and other observers of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have seen this issue with American companies like Blackwater.  
Do the Laws of War apply to PSCs?  This has yet to be completely resolved 
and leaves an opening for states to leverage NLW techniques.    
 
Conclusion: The Future of Non-linear War  
The general success of Russia’s non-linear campaign in Ukraine has bolstered 
the validity of this method of warfare.  Defining non-linear warfare as 
unconventional operations carried out by states—and recognizing that it is 
distinct from hybrid warfare, which are operations carried out primarily by 
insurgents with state support—is critical as it will push the limits of what is 
considered warfare.  It has been over two years and Russia still controls 
Crimea and has a frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine.  It continues to probe its 
neighbors without much interference other than Turkey shooting down 
Russian aircraft as mentioned.   
 
The world can see that NLW will play a large part in the future.  China has 
adapted a number of Russia’s non-linear methods and created a few of its own 
to expand its influence and force its will upon its neighbors throughout the 
South China Sea.  China has started to build artificial islands and claim them 
as Chinese territory.  Additionally, they have built airstrips on some of these 
artificial islands and militarized others.41  These islands lay in an area with 
claims by multiple countries while others lay in international waters.  China 
was able to build these islands by exploiting relations in the region and 
because of the limited ability or willingness of any state(s) to challenge 
directly China in its actions.  This method of creating islands falls into a gray 
area within international law.  In addition, there have been reports of the 
Chinese navy using merchant and fishing boats to intimidate and circle 
                                                          
40 Alexey Eremenko, “Blackwater.ru: The Future of Russian Private Military Companies,” 
The Moscow Times, November 12, 2014, available at: 
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foreign warships close to these artificial islands.  One source called this 
maritime militia part of China’s “little blue men” in reference to Russia’s 
“little green men” used in Crimea.42  All of these actions carried out by China 
fall outside the term hybrid warfare.  Clearly, nonlinear warfare will play a 
major role in geopolitical and military interactions around the globe.    
 
The non-linear efforts reviewed here only graze the innumerable amount of 
possible non-linear operations.  They also display that the term of hybrid 
warfare does not encompass such operations.  The longer that states like 
Russia can challenge the international order and pursue non-linear methods 
without being checked, the more they will encourage other states to do the 
same.  This threat will only continue to expand in the coming years and can 
only be countered with a strong and active deterrence.  Military experts and 
world leaders alike need to realize severity of these threats and respond 
accordingly.   
 
Notably, if Russia tries a non-linear action in a NATO member country will is 
it clear enough to evoke Article 5?  If a Russian citizen fosters unrest among 
the ethnic Russian populations of the Baltic States, is it an act of war?  
Military and political leaders need to review their understanding of warfare 
and frame it with proper terminology.  Calling Russia’s operations in Ukraine 
hybrid warfare starts the whole decision making process on a faulty 
foundation and will lead to poor policy in response.  This paper has defined 
and highlighted NLW so that a solid foundation may be built upon during the 
analytical procedures for strategic decisions.  Non-linear warfare will have 
devastating effects if not addressed; the problem is the war is already 
underway. 
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